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Repugnance Management and Transactions in the Body†
By Kieran Healy and Kimberly D. Krawiec*
Alvin Roth remarks that, although it often
gets in the way of market exchanges, “predicting when repugnance will play a decisive role
is difficult, because apparently similar activities
and transactions are often judged differently”
(Roth 2007, p. 42–43). It certainly took the
staff of Space World by surprise. In November
of 2016, in the Japanese city of Kitakyushu, the
management of the Space World theme park was
looking for a way to boost attendance at their
ice rink. To this end, they purchased about five
thousand fish of various kinds from the local
market—sprats, mackerel, rays, and other species—and froze them into the rink in a variety
of attractive and whimsical patterns. The park’s
management thought that both the innovative
display and the prospect of gliding above the
suspended fish would surprise and delight visitors to the park all through the winter.
People were disgusted. Public reaction was
swift, unequivocal, and rapidly international
in scale. The rink was condemned as creepy,
grotesque, and abusive; an insulting waste of
food; and an affront to both human and piscine
dignity. Space World’s spokespeople scrambled to react. They apologized profusely. They
lamented that they had perhaps not done a good
enough job explaining to the public that the fish
were already dead when they had been frozen in
the rink. (Pointing this out did not seem to help
matters.) By the end of the affair, the story was
running around the world, the rink was being
thawed, and Space World was reportedly considering holding a memorial service for the fish.

I. Repugnance as a Constraint on Exchange

How should we think about this or similar
cases? It is tempting to begin, as the park management initially did, by enumerating the various ways that the public’s reaction was irrational
or inconsistent. An ice rink with thousands of
artistically arranged dead fish turned out to be
repugnant. But it is easy to think of very similar cases that probably would not have provoked
the same reaction. A local market filled with the
same dead fish destined for dinner plates is not
repugnant. Neither would a tank full of thousands of trapped living fish provoke much reaction, most of the time. Moving along a different
axis, visitors to natural history museums see
pinned, stuffed, or otherwise preserved animals
all the time. We could easily multiply examples.
Once we see that the initial repugnant reaction
has a weak basis, it should be possible to focus
on the benefits—like a nice family day out at
Space World—that would flow from allowing
those who would like to visit the rink to buy a
ticket.
From the 1980s into the 2000s, a steady stream
of articles by economists pursued something
like this strategy when analyzing the shortage
of transplantable human organs, and especially
kidneys (Cohen 1989; Hansmann 1989; Blair
and Kaserman 1991; Kaserman and Barnett
2002). An exemplary treatment, by Becker and
Elías (2007) estimates the likely price of transplantable kidneys and livers, and the probable
increase in supply as the result of introducing
monetary incentives. The authors also consider
various criticisms and objections. They point out
that many quite similar transactions do not provoke the reaction that exchange is immoral, or
a suspect case of “commodification.” They note
the similarities to surrogacy, for instance, as one
of several cases of exchange in human goods
that goes ahead without much controversy.
They also develop the example of voluntary
paid military service as a useful point of comparison, involving as it does similar questions
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of bodily risk, quality control, the independent
moral value of the activity, and the possibility
of crowding out of other motives. And like most
of the previous literature in this vein, they end
by quite reasonably arguing that reliance on a
purely altruistic system “imposes an intolerable
burden on thousands of very ill individuals who
suffer and sometimes die” as they await a transplant (Becker and Elías 2007, p. 22).
This way of framing the discussion within
economics descends from a debate between
Arrow (1972) and Singer (1973) in the wake of
Titmuss’s (1971) indictment of the market for
blood in his book The Gift Relationship. Later
interventions by Walzer (1983) and Anderson
(1993) kept the engagement on mostly philosophical terrain, focused on the idea of commodification. Economists were generally
unpersuaded by the idea, and instead emphasized the welfare benefits flowing from mutually beneficial exchanges, even when those
exchanges might seem distasteful to some
observers. Debate tended to stall out in disagreements about how to weigh gains from trade
against moral goods.
Roth (2007) took a slightly different approach.
His discussion of repugnance acknowledged
both its often arbitrary quality and its stubborn
persistence in the case of many (but not all)
exchanges in bodily goods. The focus on repugnance as an empirical phenomenon, in contrast
to commodification as a moral problem, opened
a connection to research on the psychology and
sociology of exchange. It also shifted attention
to the role of repugnance in constraining trade,
and the challenge it posed when considered as a
problem of market design. The goal then became
one of constructing systems—such as an in-kind
kidney exchange scheme—that succeed in realizing gains without triggering a repugnance
reaction among participants or among observers
in the wider world.
II. Repugnance as a Management Problem

In the easiest transactions, prices specify
the costs and gains for all those involved and
there is no controversy about the goods or the
exchange partners. While it is tempting to think
of these as the simplest cases, often it is the
quickest and most straightforward transactions
that require the most institutional infrastructure.
Stock exchange trades, to take just one example,
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happen easily thanks to a vast institutional and
regulatory structure that underpins and guides
them.
Other transactions are not so clear-cut. In
such cases, both participants and observers want
to establish what sort of exchange is happening, in order to ensure not just that it is mutually beneficial but also that it is in some sense
legitimate, respectable, or appropriate to the
statuses or roles of those involved. It is in these
circumstances that repugnance can appear, and
also when various strategies to ameliorate it may
be deployed.
Social scientists have documented the strategies that people employ to manage these
awkward exchanges. They are generally interpreted as cases where something in a socially
sacred category threatens to come into contact
with the generally profane world of money and
prices (Bohannan 1955). The exchange may be
shut down, actively reclassified, or reframed
(Fiske and Tetlock 1997). It may take place
after substantial “relational work” is done by
participants to manage its potentially negative
effects (Zelizer 2005). Or it may be structurally recast and obfuscated, so participants can
plausibly claim it is not an exchange at all
(Rossman 2014). The strategies are more stable than the particular sacred things, which—
as Durkheim (1997) long ago argued—can be
quite arbitrary.
The most widespread methods for ameliorating repugnance have deep roots. They often rely
on some form of gift exchange, on a mutually
understood local rule governing ongoing reciprocity between kinds of actors, or on contingent agreements concerning the acceptability
of a transaction. Understanding basic strategies
of reframing and obfuscation helps us see how
exchanges are accomplished locally, and helps
us understand how individuals reframe transactions to make them palatable.
However, the growth of potentially repugnant
exchanges creates new problems. The scale and
scope of trade in bodily goods, for example,
means that individuals neither broker transactions on their own, nor individually agree on
the character of individual exchanges. Instead,
the management of repugnance happens organizationally and institutionally (Healy 2006).
Organizational staff, e.g., in hospitals or procurement organizations, frame and manage the
exchange for donors and recipients who are
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usually one-shot participants in a transplant
process. This also means that organizations are
embedded in ongoing relationships of their own,
not with individual patients but with peer organizations and agencies involved in the process
of supply and demand. Their staff will be concerned to establish the legitimacy of the organization as well as to defend its perceived interests
(Healy and Krawiec 2012).
III. Repugnance Management as a Legal
Problem

These strategies may give rise to legal problems that subsequently constrain the ability
of market participants to engage in particular
forms of repugnance management. In particular, the persistence of gift-like solutions to taboo
trades may be at odds with a transaction’s legal
categorization as market-based, creating tension
between an accepted, and useful, cultural narrative, on the one hand, and legal definitions and
requirements, on the other.
Sometimes, the result of these tensions may
be merely inconvenient, as when, for example,
egg donors, having been told that the money
received from egg donation is a thank-you gift,
resist taxation of that same money as ordinary
income, to the consternation of the IRS and tax
courts. At other times, the result could be much
more severe, as would be the case if innovations
in kidney exchange were, ex post, ruled to violate the National Organ Transplantation Act’s
ban against valuable consideration, even though
no money has changed hands. The egg donor
example involves unpleasant tax consequences
for individual donors and may—at least in the
long term—undermine the gift narrative that
market participants work so hard to foster. But
the organ donation case could result in the termination of life-saving procedures and, in theory at
least, the criminal prosecution of exchange participants and organizers.
At any particular layer, exchange partners or
brokering organizations must manage the reactions of their peers. Coordinating organizations
like hospitals, transplant centers, and fertility
centers must work with both donors and recipients to find a format for the exchange that is
both medically safe, acceptable in terms of costs
and benefits, and not repugnant. Otherwise, participants will back out and the transaction will
fail. But repugnance also arises vertically. State
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actors, like the IRS, the Department of Health
and Human Services, and courts, are concerned
about avoiding repugnant or corrupt transactions, too. As will be shown, decisions made
at this level may rely on a quite different set of
relevant facts or rules when it comes to determining whether an exchange violates a legal or
ethical standard.
Egg donation—where the obfuscating role
of gift exchange is particularly evident—provides a useful illustration of repugnance management’s horizontal and vertical elements.
Exchange in human eggs has long successfully
incorporated substantial payments to donors.
Although donors are well-compensated, fertility organizations, egg donors, and egg recipients all characterize egg donation as a precious
gift. Payments to donors are often packaged as a
“thank-you” gesture by recipients or as a form of
cash compensation for discomfort experienced
in the donation process that could never (and is
not intended to) fully compensate a donor giving the miraculous “gift of parenthood.” This
framing is strongly encouraged by fertility organizations, who often remind donors not to think
in self-interested terms about the money they
will receive, and who distrust donors who seem
overly motivated by the prospect of payment
(Almeling 2011).
Although market participants may share a
vision of egg donation as a gift-like exchange
in which some money changes hands, this is
not a categorization recognized by the law,
which often requires firm definitions where
participants would prefer none. In the case of
egg donation, for example, some questions that
arise are: Is the money received by donors taxable income? If not, then what do the payments
represent? If donors are to be taxed, then what
type of income is it: income from the sale of
assets (the eggs) or income from the provision
of a service?
Perhaps it is a testament to the power of gift
framing that, until recently, there was no definitive statement on the proper tax treatment of
proceeds earned from egg donation, despite the
thousands of babies born each year in the United
States from donated eggs. Instead, at least some
egg donors simply contested the inclusion of
their compensation in taxable income, with IRS
acquiescence. The tax court intervened in 2015,
however. Although egg donation may be a loving and priceless gift in the eyes of exchange
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participants, from a tax perspective it is simply a
risky job, like boxing, football, or fishing.1
The fact that egg donor compensation occurs
within a gift-based cultural account poses other
problems as well. Payments of up to $10,000 are
hard enough to square with a gift narrative, but
participants managed it. Egg donation is physically risky, after all, and there was a general
consensus that egg donors deserved something
for their efforts. Besides, all market participants
recognized that without some compensation
there would be very few egg donors. But once
incentives enter the picture they threaten to
undermine gift framing entirely. Would fertility
centers and patients compete for the most desirable egg donors? How do you square extremely
large payments that vary with the donor’s
beauty, intelligence, or race with the notion that
payments to egg donors are mere thank-you
gestures or a token in recognition of physical
discomfort?
To address these concerns, the fertility industry eventually settled on “ethical pricing guidelines” that limited egg donor compensation to a
maximum of $10,000 per donation cycle (Ethics
Committee of the ASRM 2004). Such an agreement, they argued, would not only reinforce that
egg donors were motivated, at least in part, by
altruism, but would also protect against coercion and commodification, and ensure the safety
of egg donation for both donors and recipients.
Once again, however, the state (and the plaintiffs’ bar) saw things differently. Specifically,
they saw an illegal agreement among competitors not to compete on price, in violation of
US antitrust law (Krawiec 2015). The resulting nationwide class action lawsuit eventually
settled, with the fertility industry agreeing to
remove the pricing guidelines and to implement
no others in their place (Krawiec 2015).
IV. Conclusion

Researchers have come a long way toward
understanding the role of repugnance when considering transactions in the human body. Yet,
often, the focus remains on exchange between
individuals and how they mentally cope (or not)
with repugnance. But these exchanges entail an
1
Perez v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 144 T.C.
4 (2015).
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additional “vertical” dimension. Organizational
and state actors play a role both in directly managing repugnance in exchange and in placing
limits on the specific repugnance management
tools that market organizers may employ.
By treating repugnance as a problem that
arises not only between individuals, but also at
organizational and regulatory levels, we can better see why it is unlikely that a single, harmonized system of exchange in bodily goods will
emerge with the passage of time. The consolidation and success of particular exchanges (such
as with organs, eggs, or bone marrow) tends to
create new problems in different parts of the
system. The result is that the management of
exchange in particular goods tends to fluctuate
between different forms, depending on the kind
of moral, ethical, or legal problem that people
want to avoid.
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